Cyber Ethiopia

Surveying international images of Ethiopia at the Close of the 19th Century, and with them the imperial, or state, interests of various European powers, we saw, in the last two issues, that the closing years of the nineteenth century witnessed various efforts to challenge the very existence of Ethiopia, and to "rectify" the country's then political boundaries. By the early years of the twentieth century the independence of Ethiopia, and the at least semi-inviolability of its frontiers, were, however, largely accepted in the international field. The Great Powers, as we all know, were by then actively competing among each other to gain influence with Emperor Menilek, and/or to achieve commercial dominance in his empire. Robert P. Skinner, the American To capture the new spirit of the early twentieth

century, we take for today's text the memoirs of the first United States envoy to Ethiopia: Robert P. Skinner's "Abyssinia of To-day", published in New York in 1906. In this important, but too often ignored, book he describes what he had learnt during a brief visit to "the Court of the King of Kings", i.e. Emperor Menilek II, in 1903-4. Looking at the Ethiopian situation, never forget, through American eyes, he discusses the commercial interests of the European Powers, critically, but very frankly, and declares: "The role of the various Legations in Addis-Ababa is purely political. The American mission was the only one based upon purely commercial considerations which Menelik had received up to the date of our arrival. Of course, numerous private and semi-official missions have visited him, with certain specific objects in view; but America was the first country to establish diplomatic relations for the avowed purpose of protecting and extending commerce, and without a political issue of any character to discuss. It will be said, perhaps, that the ultimate aim of all the European Powers is to promote commerce, and that it is only for the purpose of promoting commerce that colonies are established and official relations maintained. This may be perfectly true in principle, but in practice, at least, the matter of frontiers, balance of power, and kindred questions, are so far in the foreground that the ultimate commercial ambition is entirely overshadowed. The purposes and interests of the United States in Ethiopia are so patent without definition that they may be dismissed with a few words. "Our Honest American Cotton Goods" "Waiving all regard for the probably important future of Ethiopia as a commercial nation, we had enjoyed for years a trade in certain of our goods, notably cottons, more valuable than any other import trade in the [Ethiopian] empire. To reach these customers of ours, our merchandise had to cross either British, French, or Italian soil. The frequently abused missionary had gone to Africa many years before present political conditions prevailed, and had introduced some of our honest American cotton goods with the success stated above. This was a trade in which no American [commercial] houses were directly engaged, but the benefits thereof were no less directly enjoyed by American farmers and working men". Turning to the advent of the European colonial powers, Skinner continues: "Trade Made to Follow the Flag" "Then came the partition of Africa by the European Powers into spheres of influence, the creation of Customs-houses, and all those administrative measures whereby trade is made to follow the flag. The French took hold of Madagascar, and as abruptly as Napoleon announced that the House of Braganza no longer reigned in Europe, our long-enjoyed cotton trade ceased to be. In the Congo Free State, where cotton sheetings are still known as 'Americani', the merchandise was now coming in fact from Belgium. Then our British friends, whose shibboleth is free Trade, had in fact extended special privileges to their own manufactures, creating conditions which made American transactions difficult of accomplishment. The methods by which this had been done were no doubt perfectly legitimate, but none the less effectual for all that. There remained to our credit, however, in spite of the unfavourable conditions which had gradually been created elsewhere, the coveted export business in cottons, known as the 'Red Sea trade'. The greater part of this was in Abyssinia, where it amounted to a monopoly. Returning to American commercial interests in the Ethiopian region, and the advent of the three adjacent colonial powers, Italy, France and Britain, Skinner continues: "Land-locked like Switzerland" "Our business in Abyssinia had grown up under shadowy political arrangements, when the Abyssinians had claimed an outlet to the sea, and which the Egyptians had contested with them by force of arms. In our time the Abyssinians had been forced back, land-locked like Switzerland, with Italy, France, and England standing guard upon the Red Sea. Our trade filtered across the Gulf of Aden, and hence by caravan across British Somaliland into Ethiopia. Then came the active occupation of the French possession by the keen-witted Gaul, the creation of the port of Djibouti, and the building up of the railroad from that point into Ethiopia. The line was put into operation during the summer of 1903. Plainly, the camel could not compete as a common carrier with the French locomotive. It seemed perfectly assured that the trade route to Abyssinia over British soil from Aden to Zeilah, and thence to Harrar, must give way ultimately to the more advantageous one from Djibouti into the interior". Skinner continues: "The One Spot upon the Globe" No spirit of prophecy seemed necessary to perceive that the forces now at work for the development of Ethiopia were, at least, not being created for the furtherance of American commercial ambition. It seemed a perfectly obvious proposition that the United States Government should look into this field, where we had an actual commercial interest of no mean importance, and defend it by the simple process of procuring a treaty which should guarantee to our people equal treatment in respect of trade conditions. We wanted to get more trade if we could, but by all means, and with no matter how much reasonable effort, to retain for ourselves such trade as we had. We had no official relations with the empire of Ethiopia; it remained the one spot upon the globe where a powerful government exercised authority over some illions of subjects recognized as free and independent, and had absolutely no point of contact with our own. It is difficult to find any large centre of international trade in these times where the American Government has not at least a consular agent to whom we may look for assisstance and information. It was an incongruous and irregular condition, and one which required correction. To investigate and report upon the trade possibilities of Ethiopia, to safeguard our existing interest by the negotiation of a commercial treaty - these were the motives which had prompted the organization of the American mission, and concerning our policy we had nothing more to disclose, and nothing whatsoever to conceal". The French: "Not Necessary to Inquire" The American position thus stated, Skinner turned to the interests of the European powers. As for the French he wrote: "The French material interest in Ethiopia is more apparent than that of any other nation, and it concerns mainly at the present time the completion and operation of the railroad from the coast. Other international claims and pretences are more or less vague and remote; but the very patent fact is that, against all political opposition, financial difficulties, and passive resistance of the lowland tribes, the railroad exists, and crosses French territory into Abyssinia. It is equally the fact that French business men are scattered throughout the Empire to a considerable extent. The growth of Djibouti as a port of transit depends directly upon the growth and development of Ethiopia. It is not necessary to inquire why the French settled themselves upon the Red Sea coast in order to see why they are very greatly concerned with the progress of Ethiopia to-day". As for the British, Skinner wrote: The British: Need for "a Strong Hand and a Clear Head" "Two-thirds of the Ethiopian frontier border upon British or Egyptian territory [i.e. the British-run "Anglo-Egyptian Sudan"] and it is easy to comprehend how these long imaginary lines may give rise to complicated questions requiring a strong hand and a steady head. British commercial interest in Ethiopia has not yet manifested itself strikingly except in the form of considerable importations from British India, and in the presence in the country of numerous Indian traders, who are among the most active and successful business men in the Empire".