Cyber Ethiopia

Tracing the story of international reactions to war crimes, and in particular to the trial of Italian war criminals, we saw that the Ethiopian Government had provided the UN War Crimes Commission with a list of ten individuals against whom it wanted to levy war crimes charges. Though the Commission had accepted the prima facie charges against eight of the ten, and of the remaining two as witnesses to war crimes, the Ethiopian Government waived the charges against all but two: Marshals Badoglio and Graziani. Since Ethio-Italian diplomatic relations had not yet been established, the Ethiopian Government wrote to the British Government, on 23 November 1948, requesting it to raise the matter of the two marshals on the basis of the Italian Peace Treaty of 1947,

which stated that disputes over its implementation should be the responsibility of the Ambassadors in Rome of the Four Great Powers. Now read on: The Foreign Office The British Government, as we have seen, had no wish to help Ethiopia on the war crimes issue, especially as this would have risked incurring the displeasure of the Italian Government. The Foreign Office view was stated very frankly by one of its officials, Francis Brown, in a minute of 30 November 1948. He stated that the Ethiopian letter raised "two main questions": Firstly, "whether we should, as requested, pass on the Ethiopian request to the Italian Government"; and, secondly, "whether we should do anything more to persuade the Ethiopian Government not to demand the surrender of Marshals Badoglio and Graziani". As for the first question, he declared that it was "clear" that "we have taken the line that this question is one to be settled by the Ethiopian and Italian Governments direct". Noting that Ethiopia was "not in diplomatic relations with the Italian Government", he continued: "I understand that we have in the past, in minor matters, acted as a channel between the two Governments. In the present case, however, I think that it would be extremely unwise to act as a channel, since the Italians would inevitably feel that we were to some extent at least, backing the Ethiopians' request, and that this would come at a particularly unfavourable juncture when the question of the disposal of Eritrea is already embittering Anglo-Italian relations." On the second question, as whether to dissuade the Ethiopians from continuing with their proposed prosecution of the two accused, he argued that the British Government should leave the matter alone, "and not bring pressure to bear, even if we could, on the Ethiopian Government". Agreeing that Ethiopia had "a perfect right" to "demand the hand-over" of the two marshals, under Article 45 of the Peace Treaty, he argued that if it succeeded in communicating with the Italian Government, and the latter refused to hand over the accused, thereby creating a "dispute in terms of the Treaty", the matter would come to the four Ambassadors in Rome. In such an event the Foreign Office would have to make up its mind "what line to adopt". Brown was on the whole opposed to meeting the Ethiopian Legation's request. His view was shared, as far as we can see, by all his colleagues. One of them, John Twaites, observed in a minute of 1 December, that "all the action we need to take for the present is to tell the Ethiopian Legation very politely that this is not a matter in which we feel we can act as an intermediary". Another official, George Clutton, who had some time earlier attempted to persuade the Ethiopian Government, through its London Legation, not to take any action on the war crimes issue, noted on the following day: "I tried my best during the summer to dissuade the Ethiopians from this folly and they have now committed it at about the most inappropriate moment that they could have chosen". He was of course here referring to discussions on the future of Eritrea, then underway at the United Nations. On reading the above comments, Brown commented: "I agree entirely... The procedure suggested by the Ethiopians for bringing this request is wrong and I see no objection to our telling them that we will not act as an intermediary in this matter. We can also impress upon them the folly of their ways". This view was also expressed in a minute of 6 December from the Foreign Office's Western Department. This stated: "We propose to tell the Ethiopian legation very politely that it is not a matter in which we feel that we can act as an intermediary". The Foreign Office view was further summarised, on 26 January 1949, by Pemberton-Pigott. He recalled that his colleagues had "made several attempts to dissuade the Ethiopians from their war crimes demands", which, he argued, "came at a particularly unfortunate time", since they could "only exacerbate Italian bitterness over Eritrea", i.e. the loss of that colony. He nevertheless conceded: "the Ethiopians have a clear right under the [Italian Peace] Treaty to demand the surrender of war criminals and if they are determined on this course we cannot prevent them. But we see no reason why we should help them in their approach to the Italians". Mr Ernest Bevin The British position, thus expounded in a series of Foreign Office minutes, was eventually enunciated in a letter from the British Foreign Secretary, the Labour politician Ernest Bevin, to the Ethiopian Legation. Written on 31 January 1949, it declared that the "procedure regarding claims for the surrender of Italian war criminals" was "governed by Article 45 of the Peace Treaty with Italy, under which the Ambassadors of the Four Powers only act should a disagreement arise". Claims under that Article", he added, were "normally submitted direct to the Italian Government by the claimant Government". Under such circumstances, he concluded: [He] "regrets that he cannot see his way to instruct H.M. Ambassador in Rome to make the communication to the Italian Government which is requested by the Imperial Ethiopian Government". This letter, which was unhelpful in the extreme, dashed Ethiopian hopes of bringing the two leading Italian Fascists to trial. Ethiopia was thus left with only one option: a direct approach to the Italian Government! The climate for such an option was clearly not favourable. Report that the Ethiopian Government wanted to bring the two marshals to trial as war criminals were greeted with considerable indignation in the Italian chauvinist press. The Rome Liberta, of 23 December 1948, for example dismissed the proposed prosecution as "amusing". The Messagero, of 28 December, went further. It published a militant article, by Mario Delli Santi, who claimed that Italy had spent milliards of lire in Ethiopia, and that, when the Italians returned to their colonies, which he anticipated would take place before too long, they would find that "the natives of Eritrea and Somalia", knew "by experience the advantages which they would derive from the return of Italian rule". The Italian Government, though equally unsympathetic to Ethiopian attempts to prosecute Italians for war crimes in Ethiopia in the 1930s, at about this time decided to prosecute Graziani for collaboration with the Germans, in Italy, from 8 September 1943 to the end of hostilities. A trial of the marshal began on 4 January 1949. It was soon adjourned, but was resumed in the following year.