Cyber Ethiopia

We saw last week that Alessandro Lessona, the Italian Fascist Minister of the Colonies (soon to be Minister of Italian Africa), questioned Emilio De Bono, the former Italian Commissioner for Eritrea, maliciously, in the summer of 1936, about the cost of the Asmara-Massawa road, which had been built during his time in office. Enter Italo Balbo While this dispute smoldered on several observers began remarking, no less maliciously, that De Bono's road-building in Libya had also been particularly expensive. The fact that subsequent construction work was noticeably cheaper was pointed out by Lessona's patron, Marshal Italo Balbo, one of Mussolini's first collaborators, in an article in the journal "Nuova Antologia. This was summarised in the Rome daily "Il Messaggero" of February 26, 1937.  Much "Swindling" This statement, and

the publicity afforded to it, greatly incensed De Bono, who, abandoning the pose of unity adopted by the Fascist leaders, wrote an indignant letter to the "Messaggero", which appeared on February 27. This letter stated that the first road had naturally cost more than those built subsequently, and that Balbo's assertions had led the public to believe that there must have been much "swindling" (which was, of course, only too true!) Tension between De Bono and Lessona became so acute that there was talk of them resolving their differences by a duel. Mussolini was obliged on February 27 to appoint a "jury of honour" of four Fascists to determine whether the matter should be resolved by resort to arms, but, perhaps wisely, forbade them from inquiring into either Lessona's actions as a Minister or the facts of the road contract under dispute. The jury unanimously concluded that the quarrel resulted from the two officials' work, which was outside its competence, and could not therefore be settled by "gentlemanly proceedings." The News Leaked News of this clash among the Fascist leaders, to Mussolini's intense irritation, could not be kept from the press. The whole affair, according to a confidential Fascist report of February 28, created "disgusted surprise" in Italian political and journalistic circles, and was particularly regretted in that it had appeared in the foreign press, and could thus be "exploited by anti-fascist elements both in the country and abroad." "The Times" The Rome correspondent of "The Times", of London, duly cottoned on to the matter. He commented that there was widespread public suspicions as to "the existence of corruption" in connection with road-building in the colonies, and added: "The washing of fascist linen of any hue in public is so unusual that the greatest curiosity has been aroused by this polemic about colonial affairs being allowed to achieve the prominence it has." Mutual Hatred Notwithstanding Fascist disquiet at such publicity De Bono and Lessona continued to vent their mutual hatred as they struggled to gain a favourable decision from the Duce on the Scalera affair. De Bono, who was closer than Lessona to the Duce, wrote the latter many passionate letters. On April 28, for example, he denounced the Minister as playing a "trick" which was "neither just nor honest", and on May 7 he accused him of carrying out "pure acts of brigandage". On December 17 he wrote even more frankly: "either I am not fascist or it is obvious that the manner of action of the Minister of the Colonies is certainly not that to serve either Fascism or the Regime". Lessona, who was equally vehement, was quoted in one confidential Fascist report as having boasted that he would build his "political fortune" on the corpse of De Bono, and on that of the latter's secretary, Colonel Butturini. 2002, the "Eightieth Year if the Fascist Era" Both contenders also attempted to cast their quarrel in historical terms. De Bono declared, on May 17, that it would be "interesting" to read his letters when published after his death, in 2002, which he somewhat too hopefully wrote of as the Eightieth Year of the Fascist Era. Lessona in a letter of October 3, the second anniversary of the invasion of Ethiopia, commented that on that "historic day for the life of the Nation" he would "never have been able to think" that he would have had to pass through such "hours of bitterness" as De Bono had caused him. During the subsequent investigations there were many charges of fraudulent evidence and intimidation of witnesses, as well as bitter remarks as to the political reliability or otherwise of the various parties to the dispute. In the end on October 4, 1937, Lessona agreed, on the Duce's orders, to accept the terms of Scalera's original contract. Fascist solidarity (and corruption) had triumphed, and Lessona had thus won the day. Graziani Continues His Struggle Graziani, throughout this time, had meanwhile continued to be involved in his own struggle with Lessona over the control of communication between Rome and the Fascist empire's provincial governors. On February 15, 1937, the Viceroy telegraphed to Geloso, the Fascist governor of the so-called "Galla and Sidama" region, declaring that "in order to avoid disagreeable misunderstandings", it was necessary to note (1) that all communications regarding military operations and reinforcements, as well as matters of a political character, be sent exclusively to himself, it being his responsibility alone to correspond on the such questions with the Ministry; (2) that all telegrams or letters to the Ministry on ordinary administrative matters should always be sent to him so that he could be kept in touch with events; and (3) that everything dealing with political and military affairs was his sole prerogative, for which he alone was responsible to the Minister. He added that he was "legitimately jealous" of this prerogative. Graziani justified his position in a subsequent telegram of April 4, in which he argued that it was essential that the individual governors should be subordinate to him, and that they should not be allowed to send to the Ministry proposals concerning which his government was in many cases in ignorance. This, he declared, was a particularly serious matter should it involve the commitmentof funds. "Frequent" Violation, and "Infinite" Disagreement Such appeals, like those sent by Graziani earlier, failed to move Geloso, for on October 30 we find the Viceroy accusing him of "frequent" violation of orders, as manifested by his continued unauthorised communication with Rome. The division of Fascist authority in Ethiopia, as Graziani later recalled in his memoirs, was thus "from the outset the cause of infinite disagreement", and "contributed to creating discord between the Minister and the Viceroy's government, as well as between the latter and individual governors inclined to avoid direct control by elastic interpretation of the law." "Neither with Chiefs, Nor Against Chiefs" Differences between Lessona and Graziani were not confined to matters of procedure, but soon extended into areas of policy. The Minister's approach to colonial government, Graziani later complained, was unduly modeled on that adopted in Libya at the time of its conquest by Italy in 1912, and was thus a system of government "neither with the chiefs, nor against the chiefs, but without the chiefs." No allowance, he declared, was made for the different situation in Ethiopia where the "feudal power" and the "moral stature" of the chiefs was "much stronger and more potent" than it had been in Libya. Graziani, though renowned for his ruthlessness in that Italian colony, which had earned him the nickname of "hyena of Libya," was well aware of the tenuous position of his armies in East Africa, and therefore, like his predecessor Badoglio, felt it necessary to temporise with the former Ethiopian leaders. He claims that his stay in the country had taught him that "the best method" of dealing with "subject chiefs and populations" was to make government directives clear while removing from the chiefs "the illusion that they could be restored to direct government of the population." He thought that the such leaders should clearly be made to understand that they "owed obedience" to the Italian officials. "Chiefs and sub-chiefs", he added, ought to be "nothing but advisers" to the Italian administration. Referring to his differences with Lessona he claims that he placed greater emphasis than the Minister on the need to achieve the "loyal pacification" of chiefs and populations, including the "surrender of all arms" and "absolute obedience to orders." He nevertheless asserted that tact should be combined with firmness as he saw "neither reason nor necessity in procuring the reputation of a hard man," but rather felt the "advantage of leaning toward generosity." Lessona, with his usual arrogant dogmatism, saw no such need for caution. He later complained that the Viceroy, "through fear that his Libyan past had caused him to be considered a cruel man", ruled with "excessive indulgence." Graziani, for his part, confirms that he and the Minister did not see eye to eye, and that his attitude was presented in Rome as one of "weakness". Anti-Fascist" This charge, if we can believe the journalist Cipo Poggiali, was also levied against him by Guido Cortese, the doctrinaire Fascist Party secretary in Addis Ababa, who went so far, believe or not, as to complain, dear reader, that Garziani's regime in Ethiopia was "anti-fascist". With a view to obliging Graziani to develop a firmer and more oppressive policy the authorities in Rome bombarded him, as he records in his memoirs, with "a series of peremptory and draconian orders", which "disturbed and complicated the calm development of events." Some or' these orders, he says, were signed by Mussolini and others by Lessona, but "the formula was always the same: the Duce directs, the Duce orders, the Duce wishes."