Cyber Ethiopia

We saw last week that Ethiopia's case against ten Italians accused of having committed war crimes during or after the Fascist invasion of 1935-6 was heard by the UN War Crimes Commission, after considerable delay, at its last meeting, on 4 March 1948. Now read on: Lord Wright, the commissioner from Australia, joined in opposing the British commissioner Sir Robert Craigie's defence of Badoglio. He argued "that bombing with poison-gas involved the most elaborate preparations of every kind". Sir Robert Craigie, who had thus taken a severe hammering, thereupon naively asked "whether there was any direct evidence of atrocities committed by Badoglio in his sector while he was commander-in-chief there". Leijonhufvud, the Swede speaking for Ethiopia, replied by explaining that the Ethiopian charges clearly specified where the alleged

crimes had been committed. Those on Ethiopia's southern front were indicated with the letter "S". The remainder had taken place on the northern sector, under Badoglio's direct command. In view of the numerous incidents reported on the latter front, Sir Robert saw that his attempt to shield Badoglio was unavailing. He therefore finally agreed to list Badoglio for the use of poison-gas, but continued to oppose charging him for other bombing. Sir Robert's arguments were then rebutted by Dr Rynning of Norway. There was "no doubt", he observed" that there was no justifiable reason" for "Italian bombing of the Red Cross ambulances etc." He therefore contended that "it was very likely that Badoglio must have had some responsibility", and he believed that there was "sufficient evidence to list Badoglio as a Suspect on this count". Leijonhufvud at this point intervened to observe that this was "the first time in history" that Red Cross units were "continuously persecuted", and that the "repeated bombardments" to which they were subjected could not have been other than "intentional", and "must have been part of a policy". Strong words these! Sir Robert, whose defence of Badoglio, had thus been challenged by virtually every speaker, then conceded - what should have been obvious to him from the start - that Badoglio, as commander on the front where the alleged crimes were committed, was more likely to be responsible than a distant commander, i.e. Graziani. Withdrawing his earlier opposition, he at last declared that he was "agreeable" to listing Badoglio for the bombing of Red Cross hospitals and ambulances, as well as for the use of poison-gas. The Ethiopian charge that Badoglio had been responsible for the bombing of "undefended places", i.e. attacks on the civilian population, was then considered. Leijonhufvud contended that such attacks resembled the bombing of Red Cross units, and were "repeated all over the country behind the Ethiopian armies". He cited the book Voli sulle ambe by Mussolini's son, Vittorio, describing his pleasure in bombing Ethiopian huts. Several commission members argued, however, that, because of the war's guerrilla character, civilians might be presumed to have given support to combatants, and that responsibility for criminal action in this area would be difficult to establish. (This was dubious, in that the main Ethiopian charge related to Italian bombing at the time of the invasion, rather than to during the occupation period when guerrilla fighting was most in vogue). The commission nevertheless concluded by agreeing to list Badoglio as a potential war criminal "for the use of poisonous gases and for the bombardment of Red Cross hospitals and ambulances". Graziani The Commission then turned to the case of Graziani, which Leijonhufvud described as "the key to all the other cases", except that of Badoglio. He went on to declare that a "close study" of the Graziani case "gave an explanation of the whole Italian policy of systematic terrorism". In support of this contention he produced evidence of Graziani's self-admitted "intention to execute all Amharas", and cited a telegram from Graziani to General Nasi, in which he had written, "Keep in mind also that I have already aimed at the total destruction of Abyssinian chiefs and notables and that this should be carried out completely in your territories". The Commission then proceeded to discuss whether Graziani could be considered as potentially guilty of genocide, but concluded that the charge of mass murder was more appropriate. The Commission was at this point asked by Leijonhufvud to charge Graziani for pillage. He based this accusation on the systematic plundering of Addis Ababa, during the Graziani Massacre of February 1937, the subsequent massacre at the Däbrä Libanos monastery, and, finally, the deliberate bombing of Red Cross units. To this the Commission, after some discussion, agreed. Lessona The next case to be examined was that of Lessona, who had been Italian Minister of the Colonies throughout most of the time when the alleged war crimes had been committed. In reply to questions from Sir Robert, Leijonhufvud explained that Lessona was the recipient of many of Graziani's telegrams reporting acts of repression, and had raised no objection to them. He had therefore "participated in the policy of systematic terrorism". The Commission, however, felt that since he had not himself participated in war crimes, he should be listed only as a witness, albeit "for complicity in systematic terrorism". Cerulli and Cortese The Commissioners then considered the case of the other civilian, Enrico Cerulli. The discussion was clouded by a curious report, which was later to prove erroneous, that he was employed by the UN Secretariat, and that, before this could happen, "extensive inquiries" into his past record must have been made. The Commission, acting at least in part on this false report, decided that he should be listed as a witness to war crimes, rather than actually as a criminal. The Commission then took up the Ethiopian cases against Guido Cortese, the former Addis Ababa Fascist Party chief at the time of the Graziani massacre, and the five generals: Guglielmo Nasi, Allesandro Pirzio Biroli, Carlo Geleso, Sebastiano Gallina, and Ruggero Tracchia. The charges against all six were duly accepted. The Foreign Office The Foreign Office was not pleased by the commission’s above verdicts. This is apparent from a minute by one of the officials, Alan Pemberton-Pigott, who complained, on 28 April 1948, that since the Commission had "found a prima facie case against Graziani and Badoglio and put them on their list of war criminals", it would be "difficult" for Britain "to refuse their surrender if the Ethiopian demand should come up before the Four Ambassadors in Rome". Elaborating on the British position, he frankly declared, "We have no direct interest in Graziani", but a request for Badoglio "might well cause embarrassment". The Charges Reduced to Include Only Badoglio and Graziani To sum up the situation at this point we can say that the Ethiopian Government had won a notable moral victory in convincing the UN War Crimes Commission to accept prima facie war crimes charges against no less than eight of the ten accused, including Badoglio and Graziani, and the listing of the two remaining as witnesses to war crimes. There was, however, the problem of actually instituting legal proceedings. Prosecution faced the problem that Ethiopia had no control over the accused, and could not demand their extradition, as Ethiopia and Italy had no diplomatic relations. There could also be on denying that co-operation with the Italian Government would not be easy, for post-Fascist Italy displayed little desire to disassociate itself from its Fascist past. In view of these such difficulties the Ethiopian Government decided once more to waive most of its charges, and to restrict itself to the prosecution of only two accused war criminals, albeit the most important: Badoglio and Graziani. The Ethiopian authorities accordingly appealed to the British Government, the only one of the Four Great Powers with which it then had an agreement. It asked that extradition of the two marshals be effected through the machinery of their Ambassadors in Rome, in accordance with Article 86 of the Peace Treaty. The Ethiopian London Legation duly wrote to the British Government, on 23 November 1948. It explained that, though the UN Commission had accepted the cases submitted by it, the Ethiopian Government, "as a contribution to the early re-establishment of peaceful and friendly relations", had decided to bring to trial only two individuals, Badoglio and Graziani, "the persons most responsible for the policy of systematic terrorism". The letter continued: "In accordance with the established international practice for the trial of major war criminals, the Imperial Ethiopian Government will constitute an international tribunal consisting of a majority of non-Ethiopian judges. The principles of law and procedure to be followed by the Court will be in accordance with those of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. "It is considered that the obligations of the Italian Government under the provisions of the Treaty of Peace included such measures of custody or preventive detention as will assure their surrender to the Ethiopian authorities". "The Imperial Ethiopian Government accordingly invokes their treaty rights to the surrender of these accused and, under Article 86, paragraph 1 of the Treaty of Peace, requests the Ambassadors of the Four Powers in Rome to represent Ethiopia in this matter and demand of the Italian Government that they apprehend and surrender to officers of the Imperial Ethiopian Government Marshal Badoglio and Marshal Graziani. It is further requested that the Imperial Ethiopian Legation in London may be advised as to the results of the representations made by the Ambassadors to the Italian Government".